Contact is taking a holiday!

Francis P. Sempa, 7 July 2016

The U.S. Naval War College held its annual Current Strategy Forum on June 14 and 15, on its picturesque campus in Newport, Rhode Island. This Forum brought together policymakers, expert analysts, War College students, and interested civilians to discuss varying aspects of U.S. strategy.

The theme of this year’s Forum was “Strategy in Complex and Uncertain Times,” and it featured keynote addresses by Under Secretary of the Navy Janine Davidson, Commandant of the Marine Corps General Robert Neller, Former Ambassador Robert Blackwill, Dr. Andrew Krepinevich of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, author of War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft; and Dr. Elizabeth Economy, author of By All Necessary Means: How China’s Resource Quest is Changing the World.

The Asia-Pacific region and China dominated the conference. Each of the keynote speakers identified East Asia and the Western Pacific as the world’s geopolitical center of gravity. China’s “One Road, One Belt” and aggressive moves in the South China and East China Seas appear to be causing the most concern among American officials, policymakers, and foreign policy thinkers. Speakers also noted, with alarm, Chinese President Xi Jinping’s accumulation of domestic political power at a level not seen in China since Mao Zedong.

Robert Blackwill made the point that China is better than the United States at geoeconomics, and is using its economic muscle to provide incentives for nations to favor China’s interests, and penalties for nations that oppose China’s interests.

A panel of Naval War College professors applied the lessons of the masters of strategy—Clausewitz, Mahan, Thucydides, and Mao—to 21st century geopolitics. Dr. Toshi Yoshihara, one of the foremost experts on the Chinese Navy, theorized that China’s aggressive moves in its adjacent seas are an updated version of Mao’s theory of “active defense.” Dr. James Holmes suggested that the U. S. Navy should look broadly to the sea power strategy of Mahan and the tactical theories of Julian Corbett as guides to dealing with current Chinese naval challenges. Other panelists looked to Thucydides and Clausewitz to examine the U.S.-China confrontation in the Indo-Pacific.

Panelists, including Hal Brands and Michael Green, addressed the “strategic environment” of the Indo-Pacific region, including the cyber dimension of warfare and the need for the United States to reinforce and strengthen its traditional alliances with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Australia while improving relations with key players like India, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and other nations that are wary of China’s rise.

China, of course, has its own problems. Several Forum participants pointed out China’s vulnerabilities, such as its weakening economy, aging population, potential political instability, and its lack of allies in the region (other than North Korea).

None of the keynote speakers or panelists uttered the word “containment,” but that was the clear implication of their remarks. The geography of East Asia and the Western Pacific lends itself to a maritime containment strategy. Islands and island chains stretching from Japan to Indonesia can be used to effectively block China’s access to the oceans. America’s rebalance or pivot to Asia implies shifting resources and strategies from Europe to the Asia-Pacific, and the strategy that protected Europe (and parts of Asia) from Soviet aggression was containment.

If containment becomes the U.S. strategy vis-à-vis China, it will have to be constructed differently from its European predecessor. There is no Asian version of NATO on the horizon—historical memories and differences among, for example, Japan and South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, are too strong to allow for a comprehensive Asian alliance. Instead, the United States, as it has for decades, will have to settle for separate alliances with each of its Asian partners.

The United States effectively wielded the geoeconomic weapon in the 1980s to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities, thereby helping to end the Cold War on favorable terms. If China’s economy continues to weaken and demographic problems and political unrest adds fragility to its economy and lessen the regime’s power, the U.S. may be able to use the geoeconomic weapon to reinforce containment.

Long ago, Thucydides noted that nations are motivated by fear, honor and interest. That is as true today as it was during the Peloponnesian War, and it applies to China, the United States, and the other nations of the region.

Francis P. Sempa is the author of Geopolitics: From the Cold War to the 21st Century, America’s Global Role, and Somewhere in France, Somewhere in Germany: A combat Soldier’s Journey through the Second World War. Francis’ writing has also appeared in Joint Force Quarterly, Orbis, The Diplomat, Strategic Review, the Asian Review of Books, The University Bookman, and other publications.