[Centre for China Analysis & Strategy]
By JAYADEVA RANADE, President, CCAS June 2014
During his 2-day (June 8-9) visit to New Delhi, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi, was received by India’s new Minister for External Affairs Ms Sushma Swaraj (June 8), recently-elected Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Pranab Mukherjee (June 9). The visit was the first by a senior Chinese official after the general elections in India which gave the BJP — and especially Narendra Modi — a resoundingly clear mandate. Wang Yi’s visit was essentially to assess the views of the new BJP government and prepare for the visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping anticipated to materialize in October-November 2014. He came with a mainly economic agenda.
India’s general elections were closely watched in China where Modi’s campaign attracted particular attention. Chinese media reports observed that Modi represents a right-wing political party and, taking note of his utterances on the campaign trail and visit to Arunachal Pradesh, anticipated that India’s stand on China would harden consequent to his taking over as Prime Minister. Senior researchers in Chinese government think-tanks, though, largely differed. They were of the view that Modi’s statements during the campaign were, for the most part, political posturing and India’s policy towards China would remain substantially unchanged.
Since Modi’s election as Prime Minister, articles in China’s state-controlled media have sought to project that relations between the two countries would improve. Reflecting the sentiment, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang telephoned Modi within three days of his victory and emphasized that “China is willing to enhance mutual trust”. He expressed confidence that India would grow under Modi’s leadership. The media recalled too that Modi had visited China on four occasions during his thirteen years as Gujarat’s Chief Minister and that the bulk of China’s US$ 900 million investment in India is centred on Gujarat. Beijing’s emphasis on developing economic ties is evident in the expectation built by the Chinese media that Prime Minister Modi is focused on the economy and is ‘ready to do business with China’. Some reports compared Modi to US President Nixon and, hinting that a 180 degree turn around in policy in favour of China was a possibility, suggested that his ‘right wing inclination might create an India’s Nixon moment’.
A lengthy Chinese-language despatch on May 29 in the authoritative official news agency ‘Xinhua’, however, adopted a different stance. It asserted that China is far ahead of India with four times its GDP. It maintained that Modi has no option other than to pursue a policy of economic cooperation as India has to recognize China’s economic and military superiority in Asia. Modi would, therefore, perforce have to accommodate China not out of choice or inclination but out of necessity. Xinhua, incidentally, is the news source that the powerful Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee (CC)’s Propaganda Department directs the Chinese media to use to cover sensitive topics.
In a by now almost predictable action on the eve of important visits, Beijing chose to remind India of outstanding bilateral issues barely a couple of days prior to Wang Yi’s arrival in Delhi for his first meeting with India’s newly elected Prime Minister. Apparently picking up on Indian media reports, China filed a formal protest objecting to the presence of Lobsang Sangay, Sikyong of the Central Tibetan Administration, who was one among the almost 5,000 other invitees to the swearing-in ceremony of the new Prime Minister at Rashtrapati Bhawan on May 27. This was none too subtle allusion to the presence in India of the Dalai Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration and the 4,057 kms un-demarcated border between India and China. Incidentally, invitees to the event included personages from Arunachal Pradesh—a state of the Indian Union on which China has laid claim. Beijing’s action is a reiteration of its assertions at various levels that China will never compromise or yield concessions on issues of sovereignty or territorial integrity. This was made explicit in two official Xinhua news agency despatches issued in August 2011.
The Tibet issue did, nevertheless, re-surface in the form of protests against the Chinese Foreign Minister’s visit staged by Tibetans in Majnu-ka-Tilla in New Delhi.
On matters concerning China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity it is China’s military and security establishments that exercise dominant influence. China’s Minister of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Wang Yi, as only a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s Central Committee (CC) is outranked in the powerful Leading Small Group on Foreign Affairs by representatives of the PLA and security apparatus and has little influence. Wang Yi would not have been authorised to comment substantively on border or related issues and negligible headway on these should be expected even during Xi Jinping’s visit.
Wang Yi, who led a 10-member delegation, is a ‘princeling’ as is China’s President Xi Jinping. His wife is the daughter of Qian Jiadong, a former top foreign affairs aide to China’s first Premier Zhou Enlai. Wang Yi is an accomplished diplomat and regarded as a high-flyer by his colleagues. He is reputed to be urbane, suave and a wily, skilled negotiator who yields nothing of substance. He is fluent in English and Japanese and spent six months in Georgetown University in Washington DC.
Wang Yi’s brief was primarily to smoothen bilateral ties, assess the new government, and discuss economic issues that could be concluded during Xi Jinping’s visit. Xi Jinping, according to reports emanating from Beijing, is to be accompanied by some Ministers and 150 Chinese CEOs. Reports mention that China is considering investing substantially in the development of India’s infrastructure. While specifics are absent except for mention of a ‘Bullet’ train in which Beijing feels Japan has lost interest, there has been no authoritative indication of the quantum of investment contemplated. Economic analysts assess that with the slow-down in China’s economy, Beijing is keen on tapping the vast new Indian market. Investing in India would additionally provide China another profitable option for its fiscal reserves.
A range of subjects were discussed during Wang Yi’s 3-hour meeting over lunch with his Indian counterpart Ms Sushma Swaraj, which included China’s territorial claims on Arunachal Pradesh and J&K, border intrusions, the nettlesome issue of stapled visas, etc. as well as economic cooperation. India’s stance on issues such as the presence of Tibetans and the Dalai Lama and desire to balance China has already been subtly signalled.
Wang Yi claimed at his press conference on June 9 that China had unilaterally in a “flexible” “goodwill gesture” resorted to this “special arrangement” to facilitate the “outbound and overseas travel” of the people inhabiting territory disputed over “big parts”. Asserting China’s claim and in a seemingly pyrrhicconcession, he said “…if this is acceptable to Indian side, it could be continued in the future as it does not undermine or compromise our respective positions on the border question…”.
On Wang Yi’s agenda would have been ‘the new Silk route’, a project that Xi Jinping has taken personal charge of and which is an integral part of China’s new assertive policy of ‘Peripheral Diplomacy’, or zhoubian, for which there has been a sustained push by China. In this policy China has, for the first time ever, categorized its neighbours as ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’. The policy assures immense benefits for ‘friends’ and punitive measures for ‘enemies’. Pakistan and Nepal have been identified as ‘friends’. Together with the ‘old Silk Road’ or BCIM, also known as the Kunming Initiative, these two economic corridors will traverse along India’s vulnerable northern and north-eastern frontiers and seriously threaten the fragile economies of India’s north-eastern states, Bhutan and Nepal.
Another item on his agenda was the ‘Maritime Silk Route’. Beijing initiated a major push at the 18th Party Congress in 2012 to be recognized as a maritime and Indian Ocean power. It has begun the process of boosting friendly relations with nations in the Indian Ocean and its Rim to co-opt them into eventually granting the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) basing facilities. China’s official ‘Global Times’ recommended months ago that the Chinese government should establish overseas bases in the South China Sea or Indian Ocean. It justified this as necessary because of the ‘mistrust harboured by several countries in the region towards China, and cited as example India’s rejection of China’s request to send four warships into the area between the Andaman Sea and the Nicobar archipelago to conduct search and rescue operations’. It listed Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Yemen and Sudan as ideal countries for overseas PLA bases to extend Beijing’s influence from the South China Sea to Africa. Sri Lanka has already accepted Beijing’s invitation for maritime cooperation. Separately, Djibouti’s Defence Minister Hassan Houffaneh conveyed that Djibouti is ready to allow Chinese navy ships access to its ports. As part of plans to acquire blue-water capability, China has begun building its second aircraft carrier at Dalian which will be operational by 2016.
To a large extent Beijing’s new overture is a tactical move to allay India’s apprehensions and develop economic ties. Factors contributing to Beijing’s fresh initiative towards India are: the BJP’s reputation as a right-wing party, steadily growing Indo-US ties, rising tensions in the South China Sea and the US’ recently toughening posture. Beijing will strive to prevent India from drawing closer to the US and Japan and taking greater interest in regional maritime issues. India-based Chinese journalists have expressed reservations about Modi’s reported plans to visit Japan and the US.
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(The author is a Member of the National Security Advisory Board and former Additional Secretary, Cabinet Secretariat, Government of India. He is President of the Centre for China Analysis and Strategy. The views expressed are personal.)
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