Contact is taking a holiday!

Contact is taking a break after 25 years of bringing you news of Tibet and Tibetan issues. We are celebrating our 25 years by bringing you the story of Contact and the people who have made it happen, and our archive is still there for you to access at any time, and below you can read the story of Contact, how it came into being and the wonderful reflections of the people who have made it happen over the years.

When and how Contact will re-emerge and evolve will be determined by those who become involved.

A New Form of Espionage

By Sarah Gittleman  /  November 5, 2018;

In recent months, a growing number of countries have issued warnings to their citizens regarding ongoing Chinese espionage efforts that compromise their militaries and economies, as well as the lives of individuals within these states. While the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has long engaged in espionage to undermine other countries and exile communities abroad, recent incidents have highlighted the use of new tactics that target unsuspecting students, civil servants, scientists, business people, and other high-level figures, in an effort to use them as spies against their own respective states.

While the PRC continues to employ more traditional means of spying – which is evidenced by the recent conviction of Gui Minhai, a Tibetan who had supplied the PRC with information about the families, housing situations, and travel plans of fellow Tibetans living in Sweden – its new approach is particularly concerning, as it makes regular citizens unwitting accomplices to espionage.

With this new approach, relatively ordinary people – who often have no former ties to the PRC – are targeted for recruitment. Because Chinese intelligence officials rarely lead with asking potential targets to betray their country or employer, many fail to recognise what they have gotten themselves into until it is too late.

In some cases, students studying abroad in China have been offered small sums of cash to help with expenses while abroad. After accepting the funds for some period of time, their Chinese benefactors then push them to apply for positions within their home countries’ intelligence agencies. This was the case for Glenn Duffie Shriver, an American student who became intrigued with China during a 45-day summer exchange programme; upon his return, he was encouraged to apply for employment within the State Department or CIA. After doing so, he was arrested, and the FBI has since turned the incident into a film warning other exchange students about the threat posed by Chinese friends bearing gifts.

In other instances, recruitment occurs online, particularly via professional platforms. Often, it starts with a LinkedIn request. This process, known as “spotting,” usually targets professionals with some sort of expertise deemed useful to the PRC. If the person is believed to have knowledge of sensitive information pertaining to anything from national defence to valuable technological trade secrets, Chinese intelligence officials will begin to determine the best method for recruiting that individual: money, ideology, coercion, or ego.

Once a connection is established, the target is praised for their work within their respective field and offered seemingly benign gifts. When money, ideology, or ego are not believed to be an effective means of recruiting the individual, coercion is often employed. In some cases, the person is offered an all-expenses paid trip to attend a conference or event within the PRC. Although the offer may appear innocuous, it is far from it. Once the target accepts the invitation and travels to the PRC, they are susceptible to entrapment as intelligence officials will strive to collect incriminating photographs or financial records as blackmail in order to gain leverage over the individual.

While recent headlines regarding these new tactics have focused on the theft of state secrets and the economic and militaristic implications of these practices, the PRC also strives to censor critical discussion of its history and human rights record, and to intimidate critics of its repressive policies. Tibetans, and other exile groups, have been the frequent targets of such efforts.

Furthermore, it is not rogue actors who are behind these acts of espionage, as the PRC has suggested. After all, substantial evidence put forth by various intelligence agencies the world over – including the recent charges brought against Yanjun Xu, an alleged Chinese intelligence officer, who was caught in Belgium and extradited to the United States for the theft of trade secrets from American aerospace companies, including GE Aviation – points to the fact that it is indeed the Chinese Ministry of State Security that is behind these attempts to steal from and sabotage the interests of its foreign rivals.

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