The Mercator Institute for China Studies (MERICS) – an international research institute that analyses the political, economic, social, technological and ecological developments in China, and the corresponding global impacts – has released its most recent report regarding the state of pluralistic debate on Chinese social media in Xi Jinping’s “New Era.” Based on their findings, it appears that fewer people within China are willing to express opinions on social media that differ from the official party line put forth by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) now that new legislative measures have been introduced to tighten the party’s control over online content.
Although the report places its emphasis on Chinese dissent, the findings of this report also affect other groups who live under China’s administrative control. As such, Tibetans, Uighurs, and other ethnic minorities are also subject to Chinese censorship and surveillance.
The report, which was released November 29 of this year, documents the findings of a repeated study meant to capture the rate of change that has occurred since the study was last conducted by MERICS in 2016. In 2016 – prior to the introduction of new stipulations to enforce content control – researchers found relatively high rates of pluralistic debate online, meaning that a variety of opinions were permitted to exist, even those that differed from the position promoted by the CCP. Since then, the CCP has increased its control over all facets of Chinese society, including the internet.
While earlier cyberspace legislation originally focused on the enforcement of real-name registration and banning “illegal content,” forum operators are now required to establish mechanisms linking accounts to proper identification and to review all posts prior to publication. Chat group providers and administrators of private accounts can also be held liable for the content of discussions, and user data must be stored for six months.
With the CCP’s new rules in place, pluralistic debate on Chinese social media has shown to have decreased drastically. In 2016, only 20 percent of posts represented the CCP’s “voice,” but in 2018, that number grew to 60 percent. According to the report, publishing opinions diverging from the party line has become more difficult, as most critical content is being censored or crowded out by commentaries loyal to the party and its position.
Although recent legislative crackdowns have significantly reduced the expression of dissent, online opposition to the party line is far from absent. The recent report by MERICS notes that “the Chinese government allows a certain spectrum of dissenting opinions online.” While some may regard this as evidence of a certain level of openness, this finding should raise some skepticism.
One reason China might permit some dissent is that selectively censoring certain opinions while permitting others can limit the total number of people who are silenced online. According to the report, “going after too many different opinions is not necessary and might even prove counterproductive. Deleting every slightly dissenting post might mean larger numbers of angry, cynical social media users who feel personally affected by the CCP’s censorship policies.” In sum, limiting the use of censorship minimizes public outrage and the potential for any backlash against the government as a result of the policy.
Furthermore, selective censorship can also be indicative of an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of those who express dissent. Thus, it is important to note who is being targeted for censorship. In this case, MERICS finds that “Chinese authorities fear facts in online discussion,” and are less likely to censor posts with “nationalistic or emotional content like slander or expressions of rage.” This might suggest that the CCP is trying to eliminate more reasonable content, while portraying the opposition as more radical or extreme than they actually are.
Additionally, permitting some criticism can help the CCP to monitor dissent and counter opposition, as complete censorship would actually deny the regime access to certain information that is not otherwise obtainable. The report argues, “by allowing a certain spectrum of debate, the Chinese government has the ability to monitor and test popular sentiment – always ready to censor if authorities feel debates are becoming too threatening.” In fact, governments often permit some online dissent for intelligence purposes, or to otherwise learn about the concerns of its people in order to craft a more effective message.
Print
Email